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I.  Gengral. 
1 .  'nlB  proposaJ.  for  a.  Fifth  Company  IBI1  Dl.reotive,  ocmoern:1.Dg  the 
structure of puhl.io llm1  ts1 oaupa.nies am.  the powet"S am.  obligations of 
their  orga.ns,  was  first presentsi to the COuncil  on 9  Ootaber 1972.  1 
'nle  Eoonom1 o  am.  Soc1al  Comm1 ttee  delivera:'l  its  op:Ulion  on 
19 September 1974.2  Parliament  delivera:'l  its  op:Ulion  on 
14 June 1982.3 
'nle Comro:1Bsion  amerx'lai  its proposaJ.  to take aooount  of these opinions 
on  19 August 1983,4  am.  the  amerx'led  proposaJ.  has  been  before  the 
COuncil since tben. 
2.  'nle COmmission is nt::M  amerx'J1~ its proposaJ. for the seoam  time.  This 
seoam amerx'lsi  proposaJ. is not  int:errlEri  as  a.  general  revision of  the 
proposaJ. as it has stood s1noe 1983.  Its soope is much na.rrower.  The 
amerx'lments  it  makes  derive  ma.:l.nl  y  fran  the  Cnrrm1 ss1 on's  anilOUilOErl 
pollcy of eJ 1  m1 na.ti.Dg otstacles to takeover bids. 
3.  The  COmm1 ss:t on  does  not  wish  to  ecoourage  takeover  bids  as  ems  1n 
thenselves.  Its sta.mpoint is rather tba.t  takeover bids ma.y  generally 
be  viewEd  in  a.  positive  light  in  so  fa:r  as  they  ecoourage  the 
seleotion :by  ma.rltet  foroes  of  the  JOOSt  oampeti  tive oampa.nies  am.  the 
restruotur~ of  Buropea;n  oampa.nies  which  is  1Ixi1sperlsable  to  meet 
international.  competition.  The  soope  for  takeover  bids  sboul.d  be 
oampa:rable  from one ME'fllber  State to another. 
4.  In oerta.1n  Menher  States  takeover  bids  res1stEri  :by  the  board  of  the 
target  oampa.ny  ( "host1l.e"  bids)  have  in  fact  no  nbanoe  of  suooess 
·Deoa.use  of the defensive measures  wh1ah the board of a.  target oompa.ny 
is free  to  take umer  national.  law  in order  to  keep  control  of  the 
oampa.ny in the haD:!s of "frieaUy" sba:rehol.ders. 
5.  In  a.  oammunioa.tion  to  the  COuncil  of  10 May  1990  the  COmm1ss1on 
desor:i.ha1  the measures  it int:errlai  to  propose  in order  to  eJ1m1na.te 
ob3tacles to takeover bids.  5 
1  OJ c 131,  13.12.1972, p.  49. 
2  OJ c  1~. 19.9.1974, p. 9. 
3  OJ c 149,  14.6.1982, p.  17. 
4  OJ c 240,  9.9.1983,  p.  2. 
5  SEC(QO)Q01  fina.l,  10.5.1990. -3-
6.  The general. purpose of these measures is to secure a.  l.arge:r measure of 
demoara.oy  in oompa.n:t.es  a.m.  wider pa.rtiaipation by tbe sbarehold.ers in 
tbe  life of  tbe  oampa.ny.  Grea.te:r  sbarebolder  power  is pa.rticula.rly 
important  in tbe  event  of  a.  takeover  bid.  The  rsw  measures  should 
ensure tba.t the fate of tbe target oaupany  oa.n be decidsi by aJ.l of its 
sba.reboldBrs freely a.m. in full :k:Dowla!ge  of the facts. 
7.  'Dle measures  a.tJilOUIX)8i are a.:l.ms1  at ol::staoles of two  ld.Dis.  The first 
oa.tegory  rel.a.tes  to the ma.Ultenaroe of tbe  oaopa.Dy
1S  oa.pita.l,  a.m.  tbe 
seoam  to sba.reboldBrs  I  voting rights. 
As  rega:r ·s  the  ma.UlteMnoe  of  the  oaopa.ny Is  oa.pi  taJ.,  al::Staales  ca.n 
arise as a  resu1  t  of: 
(a.)  tbe  power  of  tbe  d.1reotors  to  aoqu.1re  the  0CIIIpany
1S  own  sba.res 
while a  takeover bid is in progress:  a.m. 
(b) the pnss1h111ty tba.t a.  OCIIJ.PBllY  ma.y  use a.  suh31d1ary to aoqu.1re tbe 
parent oampa.ny
1S  shares without oomplying with tbe safeguards la.id 
down in COmmunity  law for such tra.nsaotions. 
As  regards sbarebolders  I  voting rights,  olstaoles to takeover bids oa.n 
derive fran: 
(a) a  disproportion  between  a.  sbarebolder  Is  bol  d1 '1f  in the  campa.ny 
oa.pi  tal. a.m.  h1s voting rights:  a.m. 
(b) difficulties in br~  ahaut  ~es  in the  management  of  tbe 
oompa.ny. 
Tbere  are  provisions  of  Community  OCIIIpBlly  law  aJ.read.y  adaptej.  or 
p:roposEd which go  a  laqf way ~  l'EIIIOV1.qf  these a:tstaales, blt they 
nasi to be supplemente:l in oerta.in respeots.  ' 
8.  As far as ma.Ultenanoe of tbe oa.pi  taJ. is oanoerns! tbere are tbe amemei 
·proposal  for  ·a  Thirteenth  Company  law  D:l.reotive,  on  takeover  bids,  6 
a.m.  tbe  SeoorCI  Company  law D:l.reotive  (77  /911~), on tbe  formation of 
plbl.1o 11m1  te:1  1 1 ah1 1 1 ty oaupa.n1es  a.m.  tbe DI!Wltenanoe  a.m.  aJ. te:ra.tion 
of tbeir aa.pi  taJ..  7 
When  tbe proposal for a  Thirteenth D:l.reotive was  ameooe',  the word.1.ng 
of Artiale 8,  which prevents tbe lJoa1'd of a  target oompa.ny  fran taJt1 ng 
defensive measures  while a  bid is open,  was  ~si  to make it alea.r 
tba.t  su.ah defensive measures  inolud.e  tbe aoquis1tion of the oampa.ny
1S 
own  sba.Tes.  This  would  represent  an  exceptJ..on  to  tbe  rules  in tbe 
SeoorCI  D:l.reoti  ve,  which a1.low  a  oaupany  to aoqu.1re its own  sba.res in 
oerta.1n  oases  by  dec1 s1 on  of  tbe  lJoa1'd  aJ.cme:  in  tbe  event  of  a 
takeover  bid  such  aoqu1s1  t1on would  now  require  the  authorization of 
the general. meeting of sba.rebolders,  whiah would bave to be given after 
the bid was  l.anrobe' • 
6  O:T c 240,  216.9.1900,  p.  7. 
7  O:T  L 216,  31.1.1977,  p.  1. I 
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As  rega.Ms  tbe  aoquis1tion  of  Sba.res  in  a.  parent  oompa.ny  by  1 ts 
sn't~:Ji d1 a:ries  I· tbe Comm1 ss1 on  has proposed a.  new  d1.rect1  ve which would 
ameDi  tbe SeooOO  Dl.reotive so tba.t  tbe restriaticms it imposes  on tbe 
a.oqu1s1  tion of a.  oompa.ny Is  CMD  sba.'res would also a.ppl.  y  to a.oqu1s1  ticms 
by snm:l d:la:ries. 
9.  otstaa1.es  rela~ to  tbe  emra:1se  of  vo~  rights  by  shareholders 
fall w1 tb1n tbe ameOOed  proposal for a.  Fifth D1reotive  I  which alread.y 
oonta.i.ns  illlportant provisicms in this respeot. 
'Dle provisicms ocmoerned. are tbe foll~: 
(a.)  Art1a1.e 331  wh1ah  lays  down  tbe  principle  tba.t  a.  sba.rebolder  IS 
vo~ rights  are  to  be  proporticmate  to  his  bQld1rg  in  the 
sul:sar1.bed. oapi  tal:  · 
(b) Articles 4  azn  21bl  wh1ah deal. w1 th tbe appointment of tbe  ··JDembers 
of  tbe  supervisory  organ  (in  tbe  two-tier  ~)  or  of  the . 
adm1 nj  stra.tive organ (in tbe one-tier ~); 
Co)  Art.1ale 36  I  which deaJ.s w1 th tbe ma.jori  ty requ1re:l for d.ea:l s1 ems  of 
tbe general meet1.rg. 
A mnnrer  of abazlges are nes1a2 to these artiales in 01'der to ~ 
tbe position of tbe sbarebolders with regard  to tbe exero1se of their 
~  rights:  this  amemed  proposal  is  deS1gned  to  make  those 
abazlges. 
II.  Qommerrtacy on tbe a.rtio.1es 
Artial.e 33 
P:rQpor1;1<»»1 'ti between 
tbe sbo:rebnlder 
1 s  a1He in the aa.p11:a1 
am  b1a ynt1~ rtQ:b.ts 
'lh1.s p:rim.:Lple is la.1d down in Artiale 33(1). 
There are two  exoeptians provided for in pa;ragra.ph 2(a.) azn  (b):  ola.uses 1n 
the liiiEIIm"azxium am a.rtiales of MSOO:I a.tion ma.y  allow 
(1) restriotion  or  exclusion  of  tbe  right  to vote  in respeot  of  sba.'res 
which oa.rry spea1al  advantages: am 
(2) rest:riotion  of  votes  in  respeot  of  sba.'res  allottsi  to  the  same 
sba.rebo1dar. 
Recourse  to  these  exoeptians  ma.y  ba.ve  OODSeq11BIX)e8  Contrary  to  the 
· pt'.1miple  of  equal  trea.tment  of  sbareholders~  pu.~ tbe  pc:Mn'  to  make 
dec-1 sions in tbe hams of a.  m1nor1  ty of sb&Tebolders. 
In 01'der  to strengthen the pos1  tion of aJ.l  the sba.rehoJ.ders  rega.rding  the 
exero1se of tbeir vo~  rights  I  1 t  is proposed tba.t tbe soope of tbe. first 
exoeption  should.  be  l:lm1.ts1  azn  tba.t  the  seocmd  exoeption  should.  be 
removed. - 5-
The  first  exoeption  perm1  tted. by  the  Dl.rective  woul.d  allow  oampa.nies  to 
issue  prefereooe  sba.1'es  to  meet  partiouJ.ar  f1 na.nat qt  requ.1rements.  The 
restriotion or exclusion of votiqt rights in respect of prefereooe sba.1'es 
is always  offset by  speo1 a1  advantages  oonferrai  on  tbe1r  hoJ ders.  The 
advantages  may  rel.ate  to  the distribltion of  profits  (a prior  o.1.a1m  to 
dividends,  or  a  higher  rate  of  div:l.dend.,  for  example),  or  to  the 
distribltian of the assets in the event. of l.1.qu.1.da.tion. 
But if  tbere is no  llm1  t  to tbe issue of such sba:res vo~  rights may  oame 
to be ooooentrated in tbe baD:.!s  of a  smaJ.l  mlJDber  of sbarebol.ders friendly 
to the boa.rd..  To ecsure a  ha.l8l'l0e between tbe advantages 8Di disadvantages 
of  tbe  pre:r 3rEID08  sbare  systan,  tbe  new  ane  dment  would  restrict  the 
p:referecoe  sbares  issued  to  a  fixed  percentage  of  tbe  total  volume  of 
shares.  On  tbe  model  of  legislation  in  several  Jlenirer States,  it is 
proposal tba.t tb1s oe1 J 1 qf should be  5QW,  of tbe sul::soribEn oa.pi  tal. 
In addition, if the  oampa.ny  fails to oamply with its abl.:l.gation  to grant 
the praDised. speo1 a1  advantages w1 thin a  given t:iJDe,  wh1.ah  may  not exoeai 
three oanseoutive years,  such sbares woul.d  autalla.tioa:J J  :y  aoqu1re the right 
to vote. 
The  seoom  exoeption  to  the  "<me  sbare  ODe  vote"  pr1Doipl.e  woul.d  have 
allowed restrioticms on the mnn'her  of votes wh1.ah  may  be oast by a  siDgl.e 
sba.rebolder,  prov:l.da1 tbe restriotion appUed. at least to all sba.reholders 
of tbe same  a1.ass. 
Onl1ke  tbe restriotion of votiqf rights in respect  of p:refereooe  sbares, 
this k1D:i  of restriction is offset by no  advantages whatsoever.  The  only 
purpose  of  oJ auses  in  tbe  J~~E~~m&Dium  or  ·art1ales  which  impose  such 
restrioticms  seems  to  be  to  protect  smaJ.l  sbareholders  against  big 
sba.'rebol.ders.  Sima tbe first amemm  proposal was  put  forward,  however, 
such  oJ auses  have  grown  stead1 J  :y  more  oc ""iiJD,  am.  in many  oases  form  an 
i.nsu:rmountal:lle mrrier to tbe takeover of a  OCIIIp&Dy.  It no  l~er  appears 
reasanahle  to  deprive  a  sbarebolder  of  his  vo~ rights  without  any 
oaapensation.  Nor  does  tbe  D1.reotive  lea.ve  minor!  ty  sba:rebolders 
unproteoted.  Safeguards  are  l&1d  down  for  their  l:lenefi  t  rega.rdi.Dg 
prooee11qf8  to  enforce  J1ab1Hty  brought  on  behalf  of  tbe  oampa.ny 
(Artiales 16 am.  18),  tbe  oonveo1.qf  of  tbe general  mee~ (A'rtiale 23), 
tbe  ilXllusion  of  new  1 teas  on  tbe  agema  of  the  general  meetiqt 
(A'rtioJ.e 25) 8Di the d1sm1 ssa.J  of tbe ami  tors (Artiale 65). -6-
Artiales 4 am  2lb 
APg>1 ntJpent of l!!fiPbe:rs 
of tbe ~  o~  or  adm' p1 strative Olllan 
The D1reotive inoorporates tbe pr1:Do1ple  tbat tbe membe:rsb1p  of the organs 
of tbe oaupa.ny amnot be dea1da1 without referecoe to tbe general mee~. 
But it may  be tbat  the geceral.  mee~'s power  to exero1se its r~t to 
appoint  lllfiDl"ers  of  tbe  OCillpBZly  organs  1s  restriotei by  clauses  in  the 
a:rtiol.es or memoraD1um  which give the holders of cme  oa.tegory of shares an 
exolusive r~t  to T(JII1na:te  Cl9Td1dates for such appointments. 
Such  olauses  do  not  deprive  the  general ~  of  its  power  of 
appointment.  But  tbat  power  would  be  appreo.1.ably  restrioted  if the 
:requirement tba.t tbe general meet1ng choose from~  Cl9Td1dates  nom1nata1 
in this  way  were  to  apply  to  a  major!  ty  of  the  pl  aoes  an  the  oampa.ny 
organs. 
The  seoom  amemai  proposal  would  tbe:re:f'ore  expressly  prah1..h1t  such 
oJ anses.  .  A  new  paragraph to tbat effect 1s inserted into Art:l.al.es 4  ani 
2lb,  deal 1  qt w1 th the appointment of tbe JDEIIIbers  of tbe supervisory organ, 
in tbe two-tier sptem,  am.  of tbe MJm1n1strative  organ,  in the cme-tier 
sptem. 
Article 36 
Ma.jority rtqn1 m\ in ~eneral. meet'~ 
This prov1s:l.an speaifies the majority llOJ.'maJ.ly  req:u1.r8i for resolutions for 
the geceral mee~, namely an ab:lolute major!  ty of votes oast by all the 
sbareboJ.ders present or :representai. 
As  currently draftai, however,  tbe Artial.e allows tbe law or tbe memor&Dium 
or a:rtiol.es of assoa1atian to require a  greater majority for any al.ass of 
deo1s1an.  · 
'Dlus  sbarebolders  boJd1~  a  majority  of  votes  oould  nevertheless  be 
preventai from appointiDg or d1 sm1 ss1 ~  1IIEJ!lOOrs  of the oampa.ny  organs. 
In order to ensure tbat the powers of majority sha.reb.olders do ilXllude the 
power  to decjde  tbe  oampositian  of  the  organs,  it 1s proposai  tbat  the 
D1.reotive  sboul.d  stipulate  tbat  neither  tbe  law  nor  the  memor&Dium  of 
a.rtial.es  of assoo1atian  ma.y  require majorities greater  than  the ab:lolute 
ma.jori  ty for this purpose. 
A new  paragraph to tbat effect 1s aooordiqfly 1nse'·tai into Art:l.al.e 36. - 7-
AmerrlErt  proposa.l  for  a. 
Fifth Directive  fOll.IX:iai  on 
Article 54(3)(g)  of  tbe  EEC  Trea.ty 
~  tbe structure of puhlic 
li:mi  tai  compa.n.1es  a.trl  tbe  pJWerS 
a.n:1  abl.iga.  tions of their organs 
Ha.~  regard  to  tbe  Trea.ty 
estahl1  sh1 ~  the  Europea.n  Eoonom:l.c 
Community.  a.trl  in  pa.rticula.r 
Article 54(3)  (g) thereof, 
Ha.~ regard to tbe proposa.l  from 
the Comm1 ss1 on  ,1 
Ha.~  regard to tbe opinion of tbe 
Europea.n Par11 ament, 2 
Ha.~  regard to the opinion of the 
Economic ani Soc1al Camm1 ttee,  3 
Second 
Amendment  to  the proposal  for  a 
Fifth Directive  ba.sErl  on 
Article 54  of  the  EEC  Trea.ty 
~  tbe structure of public 
lJJn1  tErt  oampanies  ani  the  powers 
a.trl ahl.iga.tions of tbe1r organs 
Having  regard  to  the  Trea.ty 
esta.h11sh1~ the Europea.il Fronom1c 
Community'  ani  in  pa.rticula.r 
Article 54 thereof, 
Having  regard  to  the  amerrlai 
proposaJ.  from the Crnmn1 ssi  on, 
In cooperation  with  the  Europea.n 
ParJ1 ament, 
First to t;wel fth ren1 tAl  s  tt~e;i 
1  OJ c 131,  13.12.1972,  p.  49. 
2  OJ c 149,  14.6.1982,  p.  17. 
3  OJ c 109,  19.9.1974,  p.  9. 
A  new  rec.ita.l  1.s  1 pser1;frl between 
tbe  tweJ fth  a.rrl  t.h1 rt;eenth.  as 
follows: 
Whereas  the  posi  tian  of 
shareholders  regard1.:og  the 
exercise  of  their  vo~ rights 
should be streogtbeDej. in order to 
ensure  a.  wide  measure  of 
participation in the  life of  the 
oaapa.ny;  whereas  vo~. rights 
sbDuld  aocord1ngly  be 
proportionate to tbe sba.rebolder's 
stake in the  oampa.ny  ca. pi  taJ.'  ani 
l1m1 ts should be 1mposai on the 
1  QT c 240,  9.9.1983,  p.  2. 
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BAS  AOOPTBD  miS IJlkiCl'IVB: 
Artiale 4 
issue of prefereooe shares w1 tbout 
votiqt rights; whereas tbe freedOm 
of tbe general -~  to appoint 
JDSI!bers  of  tbe  orgaDS  ·of · tbe 
oaupany  shou.ld.  not  ~ ~  by 
gi~ part1oul.ar  oa.tegories  of 
sba:reboJ..ders an emlusive rig'ht to 
plt  forward  nan1 nations;  whereas 
tbe  majority  l'EqU1.r8i  for  such 
resolutions  an  the  part  of  tbe 
geceraJ.  ~  ~  be  no 
greater  than  tbe ·  ·  ab3olute 
majority; 
Art1ol.e 4 
~  1  to 4  111'!Cj'!tqa;1 
Artiale2lb 
A  new  pa;rat,ra.l)h  6  1s 1  DBftr'ta\  I  as 
follows: 
6  I  'Dle  meam"amum  or artiales of 
•ssoo1 atian may  not ocmfer  an tbe 
bolders  of  a  pa.rt1ou.lar  oa.tegory 
of  sba.res  an  exclusive  right  to 
plt  forward  DQ!D1 mtions  for  a 
majori.  ty of  tbose  JDEIDbers  of  the 
supemsory  organ  Whose 
appointment  1s  a  matter  for  the 
geoeraJ. ~-
Art;1al.e 21b -9-
Art1oJ.e33 
1.  'Dle sba.rebold.er 's right to vote 
sbaJ.l  he  proportionate  to  the 
fraction of  the  sul:sar.1bed  OB.pi  taJ. 
wh1oh the sba.Tes represent. 
2.  Notw1~  paragraph 1, 
the  laws  of  the  Member  States  may 
authorize  the  memoramum  am.  the 
a.rt1o1es of assoo1at1cm to allow: 
(a)  restrioticm  or  exolusicm  of 
the  right  to  vote  in respect  of 
sba.Tes  whiah  carry  speo1 &l 
advantages; 
(b)  restrioticm  of  votes  in 
respect  of  sba.Tes  a.llottai to  the 
same  sba.rebolder.  prov:l.da1  the 
restrioticm applies at least to all 
sba.rebolders of the same  a1.ass. 
3.  Any  sba.rebolder  who.  at  tbe 
date  of  tbe  geceraJ.  ~.  has 
not  pa.1d.  up  oalls  made  by  tbe 
oampa.ny  a.t  least one  month  ea.rller 
may  not exe:rc1se his right to vote. 
A  new  ;pa.raera.ph  s 1s 1 xvserted  I  as 
follows: 
6  I  'Dle  memoram.um  or &rtiales of 
assoo1at1an may  not confer an the 
boJders  of  a  pa.rtioul.a.r  OB.tegory 
of  sba.Tes  an  exolusive  right  to 
p1t  forward  DQ!D1na.t1ons  for  a. 
majority  of  those  members  of  the 
adm1.n1stra.t1ve  organ  Whose 
appoin'boent  is a  matter  for  the 
geoer&l ~· 
Artiale 33· 
2.  Notw1~ paragraph 1, 
the laws of tbe Member  States may 
authorize  tbe  memoramum  am.  the 
&rtiales  of  assoo1 ation  to  allow 
restr1ot1an  or  exolusian  of  the 
right to vote 1n respect of sba.Tes 
wh1oh  carry  speo1 aJ  peoun:1.a.ry 
advantages.  sum  aba:res  ma.y  not 
be 1asuoo  for an amrnmt  ffllPflR"'lll 
SOla  of  the  BI'Jl:wxr1be:i  OBiPUN · 
Where  tbe  O<J'QPfl1li  by  .  not 
fnl f1 1 1 Eli  tbe  ohl 1 i&t1ona  a;r1s1 qr 
in ~  of  B!)(lb  aba:res  for  a. 
period.  whiah. ma.y  not fWlAfri  tbree 
oonsenntive  aooount1 re yeem.  the 
bnl  dera  of  thnae  BM:res·  ·  eba.J 1 
acqn1 re  ynt1 nl  ntAts  in 
pro;port1an to the fraoticm of the 
Blllftlr1  bOO  OGitaJ  which  •tbose 
aba:res  reptesent. · NJ1  the  yot,1,qr 
riQllts  tbps  acqn1Tfri  sbaJl  he 
eq,uiva.l.ent  to  thnae  of  the  other 
eba:rebnl dera. 
.... -'. 
I  ... 
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Artiales 34 and  35 n~ai 
A1't:l.al.e  36 
1.  Resolutions  of  tbe  geceral 
meet:l.qt Sbal.l :be  ];8SS81 ~  a.l:solute 
majority of votes ~  ~  all tbe 
sba1'ebol.ders  present  or 
represented,  unless  a  greater 
Jila.jori ty  or  otber  add1  ticmaJ. 
rEqUirements  are presari.b81  ~  tbe 
law or  tbe  memoraD:hml  or  a.:rt1oles 
of assona.tian. 
2.  Paragraph 1  Sbal.l  not a.ppl.y  to 
tbe  appointment  of  1QEil!bers  of  tbe 
oampany  organs  or  of· tbe  pe:rscms 
respons1 hJ e  for  audi~  tbe 
aooounts  of  tbe  oampa.ny. 
Art;inle36 
3.  For  resolut1ooa  a.p;point:I.Dg  or 
d1 SP1 ffi1 qt  1Jif'DlmB  of  the 
N1Jp1p1 et;rative.  ~t  or 
~  ~an. neither the law 
mr the menmwwn  or a.rt1ol.es  of 
MfKlQ1 a.t:t,cm  ma.y  nqu.:t.re a  majority 
~tar  tboo the a.la)lute majority 
of  votes  OMt  l2i  a1 1  the 
present  or 
Artiales 37 to 6,1<'  n~ai 
Artiale 64  Artial.e .A 
pa.t'agrapbes  1  to 3  u~ai.  . 
A new  pa;r~*'  4  is insertai: 
4.  When  Mf"'lt6r States adopt tbese 
JJ!f¥U3llTf!f'.  tb~  aba.J 1  cxmt.a:! n a. 
reterenge to th1  s  nt npt;tve or 
aba.J 1  be NXl!1!Jp\D1 Ed lJ.i  snob 
referenoe em  tbe 000f1B1 on of 
:tbe1 r  offio1  aJ  ;pnh1 1 oa.ticm.  The 
J~K,.tbtx1a of IDM1 qr snQh · a. 
refATfl!'lOA  BbaJ 1  be 1 a:t d  down  b.i 
tbe Mf"'lt6r states. EN 
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